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REFUND ANTICIPATION LOANS AND THE TAX GAP 
 
Leslie Book∗
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The tax gap is an issue drawing increased legislative and administrative attention. 
The IRS estimates that the gap, the difference between taxes that are legally owed and 
taxes that are paid on time, was $345 billion for tax year 2001.1  Voluntary compliance is 
approximately 83.7%, and IRS estimates that each percentage of noncompliance costs 
approximately $21 billion.2  In the past Congress has admonished the IRS for failing to 
come up with a comprehensive plan for reducing the tax gap.3  In 2007, the IRS and 
Treasury responded by releasing a report outlining the steps the IRS is taking to reduce 
the tax gap, and outlined the agency’s comprehensive plan to attack the elements that 
contribute to the overall tax gap: nonfiling, underreporting and underpayment.4
The increased agency and legislative attention on the tax gap coincides with a 
time of increasing budget deficits and the related governmental quest for increasing 
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1 TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, ADDITIONAL ACTIONS ARE NEEDED TO 
EFFECTIVELY ADDRESS THE TAX GAP 1 (Apr. 23, 2008) [hereinafter TIGTA Report]. 
2 Id. 
3 A Closer Look at the Size and Sources of the Tax Gap: Hearing Before Subcomm. On Taxation and I.R.S. 
Oversight of the S. Comm. on Finance, 109th Cong. 502 (2006) [hereinafter I.R.S. Oversight Hearing] 
(statement of Sen. Max Baucus, Member, S. Comm. on Finance). 
4 This comprehensive plan consists of seven elements: (1) reduce opportunities for evasion; (2) make a 
multi-year commitment to research; (3) continue improvements in information technology; (4) improve 
compliance activities; (5) enhance taxpayer services; (6) reform and simplify the tax law; and (7) 
coordinate with partners and stakeholders.  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. & U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, 
REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP: A REPORT ON IMPROVING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 3-4 (Aug. 2, 
2007).  This report builds on U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, A COMPREHENSIVE 
STRATEGY FOR REDUCING THE TAX GAP (Sept. 26, 2006), which was criticized by Senator Max Baucus 
shortly after its release for not being a credible plan to reduce the tax gap. TIGTA Report, supra note 1, at 
3.  Since the release of the subsequent report, Senator Baucus has expressed encouragement and described 
the plan as “an important step toward fairer and more efficient tax administration.”  Id.. 
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revenues without increasing the tax rates or expanding the tax base.5  Looking for extra 
dollars from noncompliant taxpayers is less likely to generate political backlash than 
increasing taxes.  Reducing the tax gap is largely a bipartisan rallying cry.6  Though, as 
this essay reveals, efforts to reduce underreporting are not free of political risk, especially 
when targeted at well-heeled and organized parties likely to bear the costs of government 
efforts.  
This essay will look at one such effort: the IRS’s attempt to reduce 
noncompliance associated with lower-income individuals seeking refund anticipation 
loans (RALs).  RALs are loans secured by taxpayers’ expected tax refunds, and they have 
become part of the blossoming tax return preparation industry.7  Approximately 56% of 
RALs are associated with taxpayers who claim the earned income tax credit (EITC)8, a 
refundable credit targeted to low and moderate income individuals.9  The RAL lender 
                                                 
5 George Yin, Former U.S. Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation Chief of Staff (2003-2005), 
Panelist at the American Bar Association Section of Taxation May Meeting, The Tax Legislative Process: 
Past, Present and Future (May 9, 2008).  See also, Jeanne Sahadi, IRS Chief: First Steps to Narrow the 
$300B Tax Gap, CNNMoney.com, March 20, 2007, 
http://money.cnn.com/2007/03/20/pf/taxes/tax_gap_hearing/index.htm (referring to the tax gap as a “magic 
windfall” for government budget woes). 
6 “[L]et me make it clear.  We will work to address the tax gap.  We owe nothing less to the millions of 
honest working families who find tax day the toughest day of the year.”  The $350 Million Question: How 
to Solve the Tax Gap: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 109th Cong. 2 (2005) (statement of Sen. 
Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance).  “It is time to reverse the growth of the tax gap.”  
I.R.S. Oversight Hearing, supra note 3, at 29 (statement of Sen. Max Baucus). 
7 Francine J. Lipman, The Working Poor Are Paying for Government Benefits: Fixing the Hole in the Anti-
Poverty Purse, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 461, 465 (2003); Chi Chi Wu, Coming Down: Fewer Refund 
Anticipation Loans, Lower Prices from Some Providers, But Quickie Tax Refund Loans Still Burden the 
Working Poor, 2008 Refund Anticipation Loan Report (Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr./Consumer Fed’n of 
Am.), March, 2008, at 1 [hereinafter 2008 NCLC Report]. 
8GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REFUND ANTICIPATION LOANS 4 [hereinafter GAO RAL Report] (GAO-
08-800, June 5, 2008), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08800r.pdf.  During the 2005 filing season, IRS 
estimates that 9.6 million taxpayers eligible for refunds that totaled $28.7 billion applied for RALs.  Id. at 
3. Given the importance of refundable credits, and the EITC in particular, to the popularity of RALs, and 
the transformation of our tax system to one where many low income individuals have a negative income tax 
rate, this article emphasizes compliance issues relating to the EITC. 
9 The claimant must have an adjusted gross income less than $12,590 ($14,590 if married filing jointly) if 
the claimant does not have any qualifying children, less than $33,241 ($35,241 if married filing jointly) 
with one qualifying child, and less than $37,783 ($39,783 if married filing jointly) with two qualifying 
children.  INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, EITC THRESHOLDS AND TAX LAW UPDATES (2008), 
 2
will issue the refund amount to the taxpayer, less any tax preparation, filing, processing, 
and finance fees.  The sum total of these fees can be quite high: from roughly $150 up to 
$500, depending on the preparer and lender.10  RALs have created a substantial market, 
with about $900 million in loan-related RAL fees being generated annually.11 The 
presence of fees, and the existence of ancillary service or product providers at or in 
proximity to the return preparers, raises the question as to whether the allure of these fees 
is encouraging tax return preparers to act improperly and contribute to the compliance 
problems associated with returns associated with EITC-fueled refunds.12
This essay argues that our general lack of understanding of how return preparers 
contribute to the decision to comply (or not comply) with our nation’s tax laws limits the 
ability for policy makers to take effective administrative or legislative action aimed at 
reducing the tax gap associated with returns that are associated with RALs in general, and 
the EITC in particular. It will look at one such administrative effort, the Treasury’s 
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR)13 issued in January 2008, which 
asked for guidance on whether the selling of RALs should be restricted due to such 
products potentially creating an incentive for preparers to fail to comply with due 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=150513,00.html.  Originally envisioned as a modest reverse 
income tax, the EITC has become the nation’s largest anti-poverty program.  Jeff Engerman, Administering 
the Earned Income Tax Credit: Paid Preparers, Problems, and Possibilities 2 (May 13, 2006) (unpublished 
work, on file with author).  In 2006, over $45.3 billion in EITC funds were paid out to more than 23 million 
claimants, with an average payment of $1939.  Individual Income Tax Returns, Preliminary Data, 2006, 
Statistics of Income Bulletin (Internal Revenue Serv.) Spring 2008, at 6. 
10 Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr. et al., Comments Regarding the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: 
Guidance Regarding Marketing of Refund Anticipation Loans, at 8 [hereinafter NCLC Comments], 
http://www.consumerlaw.org/issues/refund_anticipation/content/comments_040708.pdf. 
11 Id. 
12 The tax gap associated with the EITC has received considerable legislative attention, even though IRS 
estimates that EITC overclaims only amount to approximately 3% of the tax gap.  OMB WATCH, BRIDGING 
THE TAX GAP: THE CASE FOR INCREASING THE IRS BUDGET 14 (January, 2008) [hereinafter OMB WATCH, 
TAX GAP]. 
13 Guidance Regarding Marketing of Refund Anticipation Loans, 73 Fed. Reg. 1131 (Jan. 8, 2008). 
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diligence requirements designed to ensure the accuracy of refund claims.14 While I 
applaud the IRS’s efforts to examine the relationship between incentive and 
noncompliance15, and while there may be sufficient non-tax policy reasons to further 
regulate such products16, I do not believe that there is sufficient evidence from a tax 
                                                 
14 The ANPR was issued simultaneously with final regulations promulgated under Section 7216 of the 
Internal Revenue Code.  Disclosure or Use Only with the Taxpayer’s Consent, I.R.C. § 301.7216-3 (2008). 
Section 7216 imposes criminal penalties on tax return preparers who knowingly or recklessly make 
unauthorized disclosures or uses of information furnished in connection with the preparation of an income 
tax return.  I.R.C. § 7216 (2000).While general rules prohibit the preparer’s use and disclosure of return 
information current rules permit tax preparers to obtain and use confidential tax return information, in 
furtherance of marketing RALs and other products offered by the preparer or an affiliate of the preparer, so 
long as the taxpayer provides written consent. I.R.C. § 301.7216-3 (2008). The rule on which the IRS and 
Treasury were seeking guidance would prohibit the use of information obtained during the tax preparation 
process for the purpose of marketing RALs and related products.  Guidance Regarding Marketing of 
Refund Anticipation Loans, 73 Fed. Reg. 1131, 1132  (Jan. 8, 2008)  H&R Block, H&R Block Voices 
Concerns with Proposed Rules That Would Limit Solicitation of Refund Anticipation Loans, TAX NOTES, 
May 1, 2008, LEXIS, 2008 TNT 85-21 [hereinafter Block Comments] [JBHFor a discussion of a preparer-
perspective on the possible Id.  .   
15 I have previously argued that agency efforts to reduce noncompliance should take into account incentives 
that both taxpayers and preparers have to comply with applicable tax laws. See, Leslie Book, Freakonomics 
and the Tax Gap: An Applied Perspective, 56 Am. U. L. Rev. 1163 (2007) [hereinafter Book, 
Freakonomics] (arguing, for example, that the current structure of the earned income tax credit (EITC) and 
the relative invisibility of the tax return filing process presents structural incentives for certain taxpayers to 
improperly claim the  EITC). 
16 For purposes of this essay I take no view on the merits of that debate. For a more pro-market 
consideration of RALs, see H&R Block, H&R Block Voices Concerns with Proposed Rules That Would 
Limit Solicitation of Refund Anticipation Loans, TAX NOTES, May 1, 2008, LEXIS, 2008 TNT 85-21 
[hereinafter Block Comments].  H&R Block believes that the additional costs associated with the ANPR 
would effectively prevent taxpayers from seeking such products, though the National Taxpayer Advocate 
believes that the prohibition would not eliminate the practice. For more on that disagreement, see Block 
Comments at n. 114 
 
Block notes, for example, the relatively high customer satisfaction and retention rate with the product Id. at 
n. 36 and surrounding text. On the other side of this debate are the consumer advocates, who place RALs in 
the spectrum of a whole host of rather costly financial products (like payday loans and high check cashing 
fees) that exist in the market, and impose relatively high credit and conversion costs.  Chi Chi Wu, Another 
Year of Losses: High Priced Refund Anticipation Loans Continue to Take a Chunk Out of Americans’ Tax 
Refunds, 2006 Refund Anticipation Loan Report (Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr./Consumer Fed’n of Am.), Jan., 
2006, at 10 (using the term “high cost fringe financial services” to describe RALs and other financial 
products, such as payday loans, pawnshop loans, and rent-to-own agreements).  The arguments are largely 
based on the cost of obtaining RALs, as RAL fees, when added to tax preparation fees, can range from 
roughly $170 to over $500.  See, e.g., NCLC Comments, supra note 10, at 8.  For an interesting discussion 
of these controversial financial products and a comparison between them and RALs, see Michael Barr, 
Banking the Poor, 21 Yale J. on Reg. 141-77 (2004).  These products, like RALs, tend to attract myriad 
state, local and national regulatory efforts.  See, e.g. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 62-29-201 to 62-29-205 
(focusing on disclosure requirements for RALs); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. §§ 351.001-351.008 (requiring 
registration of RAL facilitators); John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, 10 
U.S.C. § 987 (2006) (capping annual percentage rates on loans extended to military personnel at 36%); 32 
C.F.R. § 232.3 (2008) (defining RALs as one of the loan products that fall under 10 U.S.C. § 987).  For a 
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compliance perspective alone to take action that would effectively limit its use.  The 
ANPR highlights the preparers’ role in taxpayer compliance decisions, and it is possible 
that RALs contribute in some way to both taxpayer and practitioner decisions to fail to 
comply with internal revenue laws.  However, the current state of research in this area 
does not tell us enough about the degree to which RALs contribute to or exacerbate 
noncompliance problems, either from a demand perspective (i.e. taxpayers themselves), 
or from the supply side (i.e., the preparers).  It is likely that other factors inherent in the 
relationship between practitioner and the refund-claiming taxpayer contribute to this 
noncompliance to a greater degree than the presence of RALs, factors such as: 1) the 
existence of the refund itself and the ability for the preparer to earn preparation fees from 
that refund; 2) the lack of ongoing relationship between the preparer to either the 
taxpayer or the tax system generally, 3) competitive pressure on preparers faced with 
other preparers willing to facilitate or broker tax refund noncompliance; and 4) the 
relative paucity of IRS audits of preparers to ensure that preparers are meeting up to their 
various responsibilities.  
Part II of this essay situates efforts to reduce the tax gap attributable to low 
income taxpayers within the broader context of efforts to reduce the tax gap overall.  Part 
III discusses the arguments that advocates have made in response to the IRS’s request for 
information regarding the effect of RALs on the tax gap.  Part IV analyzes the incentives 
for paid preparers to inflate refunds and discusses how the IRS should turn its immense 
                                                                                                                                                 
discussion of various concerns about high fees and taxpayer privacy, see NCLC Comments, supra note 10; 
Barr, supra.  For a fascinating discussion of how economists, philosophers, religious thinkers and courts 
have approached the thorny issue of firms profiting by selling goods or services to the poor, see David 
Rose, Daniel Schneider & Peter Tufano, H&R Block’s Refund Anticipation Loan: A Paradox of 
Profitability? (Nov, 17, 2005) (working paper) available at 
http://www.nextbillion.net/multimedia/2005/12/08/h-r-block-s-refund-anticipation-loan-a-paradox-of-
profitability. 
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fact gathering and research capabilities to the issues of practitioners and how practitioners 
can influence compliance decisions.17 Part V uses the responsive regulation framework to 
analyze how the tax laws might be better structured to encourage compliance. 
 
II. GOING AFTER THE BAD GUYS: SOMETIMES EASY, SOMETIMES NOT SO EASY 
 
Tax gap research and data highlight that there is not one tax gap problem, but a 
series of often distinct areas of systemic noncompliance.18  Consider the case of the cash 
economy and small business taxpayers. The cash economy and small business taxpayers 
comprise a significant portion of the tax gap.19  As Professor Bankman has noted20, the 
risks of popular backlash against the invasive audits necessary to meaningfully ferret out 
small business noncompliance, as well as the extent of agency resources needed to 
perform that labor-intensive work, are real and practical impediments to successful 
reductions in this portion of the tax gap.21  
                                                 
17 See Eric Toder, What is the Tax Gap?, TAX NOTES, October 23, 2007, Lexis, 2007 TNT 205-43 (“[A] 
key variable of interest would be relative compliance rates among taxpayers who prepare returns by hand, 
prepare returns with software, and use paid preparers.”). 
18 GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TAX COMPLIANCE: MULTIPLE APPROACHES ARE NEEDED TO 
REDUCE THE TAX GAP 5 (Feb. 16, 2007) (“The tax gap has multiple causes; spans five types of taxes; and is 
spread over several types of taxpayers including individuals, corporations, and partnerships.”); Leslie 
Book, Study of the Role of Preparers in Relation to Taxpayer Compliance with Internal Revenue Laws, at 
63-64 [hereinafter Book, Role of Preparers] in 2007 Nat’l Taxpayer Advocate Annual Report to Con. vol. 
2 [hereinafter 2007 NTA Report vol. 2]. 
19 In 2001, the gross underreporting gap was estimated at $250-292 billion, with individual income tax 
amounting to about two thirds of that amount.  Of that portion, underreporting business income contributed 
most heavily to the tax gap.  INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, TAX GAP FACTS AND FIGURES 6-7 (2005). 
20 See Joseph Bankman, Eight Truths About Collecting Taxes from the Cash Economy, TAX NOTES, Oct. 
29, 2007, 506, LEXIS, 2007 TNT 210-42 (weighing the pros and cons of various legislative options to close 
the tax gap in the cash economy). 
21 To combat some of these impediments, Bankman suggests mounting an educational campaign to inform 
the public on the payoffs to increased audits and providing a $1000 reimbursement for the costs of an audit 
to those taxpayers who have paid substantially all of their tax liability.  Id.; see also TIGTA Report, supra 
note 1, at 15-16 (noting that there are several significant impediments keeping the IRS from being able to 
rely solely on audits to eliminate the tax gap). 
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Coming on the tenth anniversary of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 
199822, IRS has stepped up its compliance activities in many areas to pre-1998 levels.23 
IRS efforts at reducing underreporting have targeted both the very rich, and the working 
poor, but have largely steered clear of some of the heavy lifting needed to go after those 
in the middle.24  Facing widespread criticism that IRS audit rates of people claiming the 
EITC were too high relative to other taxpayers25  – only 1% of taxpayers are audited, but 
nearly 40% of audits are of returns claiming the EITC26 – former Commissioner Everson 
redirected agency resources toward corporate tax abuse and well-publicized shelters.27  
Despite this shift in resources, however, the criticisms have continued.28  It is fairly easy 
to explain how the IRS can get away with hundreds of thousands of annual audits of 
EITC-claiming taxpayers – this group is largely without the voice and power of small 
                                                 
22 I.R.C. § 6212 (2000). 
23 TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, TRENDS IN COMPLIANCE ACTIVITIES 
THROUGH FY 2007 2 (April 18, 2008) (noting that despite decreased enforcement personnel, the IRS has 
reversed most of the decline in enforcement action following the restructuring that followed the 1998 
legislation).  TIGTA provides data on the extent of various enforcement efforts and noting for example that 
in FY 2007, revenue generated from enforcement increased by 22 percent to $59.2 billion.  Id. 
24 See Bankman, supra note 20 (noting that audits in the cash economy are increasingly rare, yet very 
necessary to close the tax gap in this sector).  See also Eric Toder, Reducing the Tax Gap: The Illusion of 
Pain-Free Deficit Reduction, TAX NOTES, July 6, 2007, LEXIS, 2007 TNT 130-22 (noting that performing 
both automated collection activities – which typically involve contacts with taxpayers where the amount of 
underreported or underpaid is known with relative certainty – and EITC audits are the least burdensome on 
the IRS). 
25 Serrano Voices Concern over IRS Policies, THE SERRANO REPORT (Rep. Jose Serrano, New York, N.Y.), 
Mar. 30, 2007; David Cay Johnston, I.R.S. Audits Middle Class More Often, More Quickly, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 16, 2007, at C6; ROBERT GREENSTEIN, THE NEW PROCEDURE FOR THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT 5 
(Ctr. on Budget and Policy Priorities) (2003). 
26 In fiscal year 2006, the IRS audited over 517,000 returns associated with the EITC, for an audit rate of 
approximately 2.25% for EITC recipients.  OMB WATCH, TAX GAP, supra note 12, at 14.  OMB Watch 
points out that EITC audits result in a significantly lower yield-per-audit compared to other audits.  Id.; see 
also Block Comments, supra note 16, at n.67 and surrounding text. 
27 Reporting Improper Payments: A Report Card on Agencies’ Progress: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Fed. Financial Management, Governmental Information and International Security of the S. Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Comm., 109th  Cong. 21 (2006) [hereinafter Fed. Financial 
Management Hearing] (statement of Mark Everson, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service). 
28 THE SERRANO REPORT, supra note 25; Johnston, supra note 25, at C6. 
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business taxpayers, and the Nickel and Dimed29 population is often without the means 
necessary to raise a ruckus in such a way that politicians or the agency takes note.30
For the rich and corporate America, part of the reason why the IRS has been able 
to place in its compliance crosshairs corporate tax shelters is the backlash following 
Enron.  With the Enron scandal and the publicizing of the arcane (often tax driven) 
schemes that had the potential to make the corporate income tax truly voluntary31, the 
Bush Administration put high on its priority list the aggressive tax shelter industry that 
flourished in the 1990’s.32  Even in a business-friendly Republican Administration, major 
figures in Treasury and IRS railed against corporate irresponsibility and even a lack of 
patriotism associated with corporate tax-driven schemes.33  While the administration 
could cite to success in its efforts to root out perverse corporate tax abuse, even declaring 
that the tax shelter war “was over” and “the government won,”34 the government has had 
somewhat less success in some of its other efforts to target noncompliance among 
wealthy individuals, including its offshore credit card initiative35, which held much 
                                                 
29 BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: ON (NOT) GETTING BY IN AMERICA (Henry Holt and Co., 
LLC 2002) (2001). 
30 See generally Dorothy A. Brown, Essay: Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 790 
(2007) (pointing to racial components of low-income tax policy, and the EITC in particular). 
31 See generally David Cay Johnston, Wall St. Firms Are Faulted in Report on Enron’s Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 14, 2003, at C2; Elliot Blair Smith, Enron Unit Turned Tax Shelters into Profit, USA TODAY, Feb. 14, 
2003, at 6B.  See also Linda M. Beale, Putting SEC Heat on Audit Firms and Corporate Tax Shelters: 
Responding to Tax Risk with Sunshine, Shame and Strict Liability, 29 J. CORP. L. 219, 232 (2004); U.S. 
DEP’T OF TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS: DISCUSSION ANALYSIS AND 
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 8-11 (July, 1999). 
32 See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, MARKETS IN VICE, MARKETS IN VIRTUE (Oxford Univ. Press 2005) (2005); 
Corporate Inversions: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 107th Cong. 10-11 (2002) (statement 
of Pamela Olson, Acting Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury). 
33 Recall the backlash generated by Stanley Work’s efforts to reincorporate in Bermuda.  See David Cay 
Johnston, Vote on an Offshore Tax Plan is Roiling a Company Town, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2002, at A3.  See 
also William M. Welch, Offshore Tax Shelters Under Fire, USA TODAY, July 31, 2002, at 3B; David Cay 
Johnston, Senators Assail Corporate Use of Bermuda as Tax Shelter, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2002, at C5. 
34 Pamela Olson, Now That You’ve Caught the Bus, What Are You Going To Do With It?  Observations 
From the Frontlines, Sidelines, and Between the Lines, So To Speak, 60 TAX LAW. 567, 567 (2007). 
35 Associated Press, New I.R.S. Request on Credit Card Data, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2002, at C6; IRS 
Unveils Offshore Voluntary Compliance Initiative; Chance for “Credit Card Abusers” to Clear Up Their 
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promise in rooting out garden variety fraud, but likely would have generated intense 
backlash given the size and power of the people who the IRS would have targeted.36 
Without the popular indignation that surrounded the Enron-type corporate malfeasance, 
the IRS apparently decided not to pursue individuals with offshore credit cards, despite 
the high probability that those individuals were using those cards as a way to hide cash 
that was likely not reported to the IRS as income,37 though recent pronouncements 
suggest that the IRS is moving away from this “hands-off” approach.38
The IRS efforts of the past few years to reduce underreporting noncompliance 
among corporate taxpayers and the very poor appear on the surface to be paradoxical.  
Yet, those two groups are the proverbial low hanging fruit, with the working poor too 
powerless to meaningfully object, and Congress, and the IRS beholden to a Congress 
controlling its purse, itching to show voters (especially in times of economic slowdown) 
that corporate America would not run roughshod over the income tax system.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Tax Liabilities, NAT’L FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS, Feb. 25, 2002, 
http://www.nfib.com/object/3724867.html.  Mixed results discussed in Pamela Gardiner, TIGTA Testifies at 
Senate Finance Tax Gap Hearing, TAX NOTES, July 22, 2004, LEXIS, 2004 TNT 141-45.  But see Douglas 
Schulman, Schulman Says Tax Gap, Compliance Proposals Could Generate Revenue, TAX NOTES, Apr. 17, 
2008, LEXIS, 2008 TNT 75-49 (requesting funding from Senate Appropriations Committee for program 
designed to increase reporting compliance U.S. taxpayers with offshore activity).  See also Christopher 
Costigan, PayPal Summoned by IRS Regarding Offshore Credit Cards, GAMBLING911, Apr. 23, 2008, 
http://www.gambling911.com/PayPal-Online-Gambling-042308.html (mentioning the IRS’ efforts to crack 
down on offshore noncompliance). 
36 But cf. Lynnley Browning, Ex-Banker from UBS is Indicted in Tax Case,  N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2008, at 
C4 (discussing tax fraud case against UBS banker); Andrew Ross Sorkin, New Offshore Bank Limits for 
U.S. Clients, UBS Says, DEALBOOK.NYTIMES.COM, July 18, 2008, 
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/07/18/new-offshore-bank-limits-for-us-clients-ubs-says/ 
(discussing UBS decision to stop offering offshore banking services to US clients). 
37 See Tom Herman, Offshore Account Holders Bite Their Nails, WALL ST. J., May 21, 2008, at D1 
(“[M]any wealthy Americans use [offshore bank accounts] to illegally shield income . . .”). 
38 Cf. id.  (noting that the likelihood of being caught not reporting money shipped offshore increased 
resulting from a willingness among nations to exchange information on tax havens); Press Release, Internal 
Revenue Service, IRS and Tax Treaty Partners Target Liechtenstein Accounts (Feb. 26, 2008), 
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=179387,00.html (noting that increased information sharing 
between tax treaty partners is facilitating cracking down on offshore bank accounts). 
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The lower-income tax return filers are the lowest of the hanging noncompliance 
fruit. The IRS – prodded by Congress and the reality that many lower-income individuals 
enter the tax system not as income taxpayers, but as refund-seekers – annually puts 
hundreds of thousands of lower or moderate-income individuals through the paces of 
establishing eligibility for a host of related family status benefit provisions.39  This 
process has resulted in the steady drumbeat of hundreds of thousands of low resource 
intensity correspondence audits of individuals claiming the EITC, related family benefit 
provisions and refunds based on excessive withholdings of wages.40 These audits require 
claimants to establish eligibility with a panoply of tax provisions relating to income level 
and family status in order to receive a refund or avoid repaying the government money.41
 The government’s efforts at dealing with lower income taxpayer noncompliance 
have a certain rhythm to them.  It has been marked by steady attention, punctuated by 
creative and sometimes overreaching efforts42 to get at the relatively stubborn and high 
rates of noncompliance.  Estimates of EITC error rate approximate 25 to 35%, despite the 
                                                 
39 The most important is the EITC, with over $44 billion being claimed by more than 23 million recipients 
in tax year 2006.  TAX POLICY CTR., EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT BY STATE, TAX YEAR 2006 (Aug. 18, 
2008).  For a criticism of the IRS’s attention to noncompliance among lower-income individuals relative to 
other systemic issues of noncompliance, see Brown, supra note 30.  
40 See Toder, supra note 24 (noting that automated collection activities where underreporting amounts are 
known with relative certainty and EITC audits require minimal resource expenditure by the IRS). 
41 For a summary of these eligibility criteria that must be substantiated in order to receive EITC payments, 
see Internal Revenue Serv., EITC for Individuals, 
http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=150557,00.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2008).  There is a 
significant amount of literature discussing the challenges these audits present to low income claimants, 
including the likelihood that eligible claimants are denied rightful EITC claims or simply fail to participate 
in the audit process, resulting in either disallowed refunds or an assessment following a refund which 
results in a significant liability to the IRS.  See 2004 Nat’l Taxpayer Advocate Report to Con. vol. 2, 12-14. 
42 For example, the IRS’ proposal to require pre-certification for EITC payments.  Internal Revenue 
Service, IRS Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) Initiative Final Report to Congress, Oct., 2005.  For a 
criticism of this program, see Robert Greenstein, Issues to Consider in Assessing IRS’ Proposals Regarding 
EITC Pre-Certification, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, July 23, 2003.  See also David Cay 
Johnston, I.R.S. Move Said to Hurt the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2006, at C6 (reporting that ex post 
reviews of EITC claims often result in improper freezing of EITC payments). 
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government’s significant efforts over the past ten years to increase compliance.43 
Periodically, in the face of overreaching IRS efforts, advocates would complain that IRS 
efforts were too burdensome, threatening notions of fairness and creating the conditions 
that necessitated IRS’s reversal or reigning in of its efforts.44 Yet, despite the ebb and 
flow of those efforts, noncompliance in this area is well above many other parts of the tax 
system45, and far above error rates associated with other benefits’ programs (like food 
stamps and TANF).46
 
III. RALS: GOOD, BAD, OR UGLY?  WELL . . . IT DEPENDS ON WHO YOU ASK 
 
A. OVERVIEW OF THE ROLE OF PREPARERS 
 The use of paid preparers in return filing has steadily grown.47  While some of the 
estimated 1.2 million paid preparers are subject to professional standards for their 
                                                 
43 Book, Freakonomics, supra note 15, at 1170.  The IRS estimates that in tax year 1999, there was an 
EITC noncompliance rate of between 27 and 32%, resulting in approximately $8.5 to $9.9 billion in 
erroneous claims or payments.  GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT: 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THREE NEW TESTS PROCEEDED SMOOTHLY, BUT TESTS AND EVALUATION PLANS 
WERE NOT FULLY DOCUMENTED 1 [hereinafter GAO, EITC] (GAO-05-92, December, 2004).  In tax year 
2007, the IRS issued roughly $38 billion in EITC refunds.  GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IRS’S FISCAL 
YEARS 2007 AND 2006 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 92 [hereinafter GAO, FINANCIAL STATEMENTS] (GAO-08-
166, Nov., 2007).  The IRS is able to prevent approximately $1 billion in erroneous EITC payments each 
year.  Office of Management and Budget, Internal Revenue Service Earned Income Tax Credit 
Compliance, EXPECTMORE.GOV, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/OMB/expectmore/summary/10000422.2002.html [hereinafter OMB, EITC 
Compliance] (last visited Aug. 31, 2008).  Despite these efforts to halt erroneous payments, based on a 
2001 study on EITC compliance, the IRS estimates that at least $10 billion in improper EITC funds may 
have been paid out in tax year 2007.  GAO, FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, supra, at 92.  See OMB, EITC 
Compliance, supra (rating EITC program as “ineffective” due to the high error rate even after compliance 
activities). 
44 Toder, supra note 24 (“This attention paid to the tax gap is the latest iteration of a cyclical pattern in 
which politicians alternatively call for increased IRS enforcement and then complain about the burdens the 
IRS imposes on the citizenry.”). 
45 See Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare?  The Administration of the Earned Income Credit, 52 UCLA L. 
Rev. 1867, 1887-91 (2005). 
46 For comparative compliance and enforcement rates and a discussion of how compliance and enforcement 
differ between the EITC and traditional welfare programs see id. at 1876-78, 1887-93. 
47 From 1996 to 2005, income tax returns filed by paid practitioners has risen from 63 million to 80 million 
(from 53% to 62% of all returns filed).  Michael Albert, Kim Bloomquist & Ron Edgerton, Evaluating 
Preparation Accuracy of Tax Practitioners: A Bootstrap Approach, 2007 IRS Research Conference 77 
(2007). 
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respective professions (CPAs, attorneys, etc.), many others are unaffiliated with any 
licensed profession, and are not held to any required standards.48  All paid preparers, 
whether held to continuing education or professional standards or not, are subject to 
certain requirements in preparing the return, including signing the return and providing 
the taxpayer with a copy of the return. 49  These preparers are also subject to civil and 
even criminal penalties for improper conduct.50
 The preparer’s task consists of filling out the actual tax forms, identifying items 
affecting the taxpayer’s liability, and advising clients on resolving any uncertainties as to 
                                                 
48 Book, Role of Preparers, supra note 18, at 44.   
49 The following table summarizes some of the applicable penalties: 
 
Code Section (§) Description Penalty 
6694(a) Understatement of taxpayer’s liability due to an 
unrealistic position (unrealistic position redefined 
in 2007) 
$250 unless reasonable cause or 
good faith can be shown for the 
understatement 
6694(b) Understatement of taxpayer’s liability due to 
willful or reckless conduct (willful or reckless 
conduct redefined in 2007) 
$1,000 per claim 
6695(a) Failure to provide a copy of return to taxpayer $50 per failure up to a maximum 
of $25,000 
6695(b) Failure to sign return $50 per failure up to a maximum 
of $25,000 
6695(c) Failure to furnish identifying number $50 per failure up to a maximum 
of $25,000 
6695(d) Failure to retain a copy or list of refunds filed $50 per failure up to a maximum 
of $25,000 
6695(e) Failure of employers to file correct information on 
each tax preparer employed 
$50 per failure up to a maximum 
of $25,000 
6695(f) Negotiation of taxpayer’s refund check $500 per check 
6695(g) Failure to be diligent in determining EITC 
eligibility 
$100 per failure 
6701 Aiding and abetting understatement of tax liability $1,000 
6713 Improper disclosure or use of return information $250 per disclosure up to a 
maximum of $10,000 
7206 Willful preparation of false or fraudulent return or 
other document 
Up to $100,000, 3 years 
imprisonment, or both 
7207 Knowingly providing fraudulent returns or other 
documents to IRS 
Up to $10,000, 1 year 
imprisonment, or both 
7216 Knowingly or recklessly disclosing or using 
return information 
Up to $1,000, 1 year 
imprisonment, or both 
 
50 For a discussion of various penalties see supra note 49.  For cases where the IRS has brought injunction 
actions against preparers for improper conduct, see infra note 132. 
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the tax consequences of ambiguous items.  Research into the motivations for taxpayers to 
use paid preparers has determined that people seek out paid preparers because they 
believe they (i) benefit from using preparers, (ii) lack an understanding of the tax law, 
(iii) lack the time to file taxes themselves51, and (iv) fear of an audit and believe that 
using a paid preparer would minimize the chance of an audit.52
 Exactly what effect paid preparers have on tax compliance is not entirely clear,  
though the role of preparers in tax compliance has become an increasingly important area 
of study53, and there have been several calls for more research considering the 
relationship.54  Despite the increasing use of preparers and an increased general sense 
that more research is needed to examine the role that preparers play, the GAO has 
recently noted 
IRS does little to monitor or track basic information about individual paid 
preparers. For example, IRS does not collect information on the type of 
preparers, such as whether the preparer is an enrolled agent or part of a 
commercial chain, or the number or types of returns filed by the preparer.  
Having such information could allow IRS to better identify filing errors and 
target its outreach to specific preparers or preparer groups.55
 
                                                 
51 U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: MOST TAXPAYERS BELIEVE THEY 
BENEFIT FROM PAID TAX PREPARERS, BUT OVERSIGHT FOR IRS IS A CHALLENGE 7-12, GAO-04-70 (2003). 
52 Lin Mei Tan, Research on the Role of Tax Practitioners in Taxpaying Compliance: Identifying Some 
Gaps, in TAXATION ISSUES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 17 (Adrian Sawyer ed. 2006). 
53 For a discussion of the various ways that gatekeeper measures can temper aggressive tax planning, see 
Susan Cleary Morse, Using Salience and Influence to Close the Tax Gap 14-16 (working paper, 2008), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1139891.(referring to raising filing 
standards, reducing privilege, increasing penalties, tightening disciplinary procedure, imposing additional 
licensing requirements, and modifying tax preparers’ investigation obligations as gatekeeping measures to 
promote compliance). See Book, Role of Preparers, supra note 18, at 74; Steven Klepper, Mark Mazur and 
Daniel Nagin, Expert Intermediaries and Legal Compliance: The Case of Tax Preparers, 34 J.L. & ECON. 
205 (1991). 
54 See Book, Role of Preparers, supra note 18, at 74; 2007 Nat’l Taxpayer Advocate Report to Con., at 95 
[hereinafter 2007 NTA Report]. 
55 U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: 2007 FILING SEASON CONTINUES 
TREND OF IMPROVEMENT, BUT OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE COSTS AND INCREASE TAX COMPLIANCE 
SHOULD BE EVALUATED 18, GAO-08-38 (2007) [hereinafter GAO, 2007 FILING SEASON].  IRS is slowly 
awakening to the importance of tracking data relating to preparers. Id. 
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Though there is not much quantitative or qualitative research relating to preparers, there 
are some likely explanations as to how preparers can contribute to noncompliance.56  I 
have previously identified seven ways that preparers likely contribute to noncompliance 
and their possible explanation: 
1. Ignorance or misunderstanding of the law – poor training, inadequate 
attention to changes in the law, or complexity of the law; 
2. Misunderstanding or failing to understand or learn the facts – language or 
cultural barrier – can also be related to ignorance or understanding of the 
law, as the practitioner may not know what information is relevant; 
3. Unable or unwilling to detect false or incorrect information, though the 
unwillingness or inability is not reflective of failing to exercise due 
diligence; 
4. Facilitate noncompliance by not exercising appropriate due diligence to 
verify facts or information; 
5. Aid and abet in noncompliance by advising taxpayers how to misstate or 
omit income, or claim inappropriate or excessive deductions or credits; 
6. Facilitate continued noncompliance by advising taxpayers how to arrange 
affairs to minimize chances of detection, including advising taxpayers on 
practices or positions that are likely to generate ITS attention; 
7. Directed noncompliance – working in an environment where there is a 
culture of noncompliance, either through insufficient quality control or 
active and affirmative exhortations to take affirmative steps which are 
meant to minimize liabilities or maximize refunds.57 
 
It is important to understand the motivations of the practitioners’ willful or negligent 
noncompliance.58  For example, the profit motive and motivations to retain clients and 
attract new customers and may drive types four through seven noncompliance.59   
 What little evidence there is suggests that noncompliance is driven by both the 
practitioners and the taxpayers.60  Therefore, how preparers react to demand-driven61 
                                                 
56 See Book, Role of Preparers, supra note 18, at 69-70. 
57 Id. (internal footnotes omitted). 
58 Id. at 70. 
59 See id. 
60 Compare Peggy Hite & Gary McGill, An Examination of Taxpater Preference for Aggressive Tax 
Advice, 45 Nat’l Tax J. 398 (1992) with Yuka Sakurai & Valerie Braithwaite, Taxpayer’s Perceptions of 
the Ideal Tax Adviser: Playing Safe or Saving Dollars? (Centre for Tax System Integrity, Working Paper 
No. 5, 2001). 
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noncompliance is important to understand as well.  I have previously laid out a 
hypothesis postulating that preparers respond to taxpayers who wish to understate their 
taxes (or overclaim refunds) in one of six ways: 
1. Refusing practitioners – these practitioners refuse to engage in a 
relationship with clients they suspect to be dishonest or overly aggressive; 
2. Signaling practitioners – these practitioners will signal their unwillingness 
to prepare returns for clients they expect to be dishonest by making 
detailed inquiries or requesting back-up documentation; 
3. Facilitating practitioners – these preparers facilitate noncompliance by 
advising the taxpayer how to take improper return positions when they 
know or reasonably believe that the taxpayer is misstating facts; 
4. Indifferent practitioners – these preparers are indifferent to the taxpayer’s 
conduct and are willing to follow taxpayer preference and overlook 
noncompliance; 
5. Incompetent or unsophisticated practitioners – given the due diligence 
requirements,62 these preparers should be able to recognize that the 
taxpayer is taking improper positions, but is unable to detect or suspect 
taxpayer misconduct because of lack of training, education sophistication, 
etc.; and 
6. Reasonably unknowing practitioners – despite the client’s misconduct, the 
practitioner does not and cannot reasonably know or suspect that the facts 
the taxpayer alleges are incorrect.63 
 
To what degree RALs affect these different causes of noncompliance is unclear, and is 
the source of a rather heated debate, which is what the next section addresses.64
                                                                                                                                                 
61 For these purposes, I refer to demand-driven noncompliance as errors relating to taxpayer submission of 
inaccurate or incomplete information to practitioners, and supply-side noncompliance as errors relating to 
preparer conduct, be it by innocent error or intentional noncompliance along the lines set forth above.  Of 
course, characterizing noncompliance as purely demand- or supply-driven does not capture the dynamic 
relationship between the two parties.  This aspect of the relationship suggests a greater need for qualitative 
research that will place researchers in the preparation process.  Margaret McKerchar, Why Do Taxpayers 
Comply?  Past Lessons and Future Directions in Developing a Model of Compliance Behaviour, in TAX 
ADMINISTRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 225, 242 (Michael Walpole & Chris Evand eds., 2001) 
(emphasizing the importance of identifying the various typologies of noncompliance and urging that 
additional studies be made relating to actual taxpayer and preparer behavior); Robert Kidder & Craig 
McEwen, Taxpaying Behavior in Social Context: A Tentative Typology of Tax Compliance and 
Noncompliance, in 2 TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE 47 (Jeffrey Roth et al. eds., 1989) (postulating that preparers 
can broker and facilitate both compliance and noncompliance). 
62 For a discussion of general practitioner due diligence requirements within the Internal Revenue Code, see 
Morse, supra note 53, at n.60 and surrounding text. There are specific due diligence rules applicable to 
returns which reflect a claimed EITC.  A preparer must complete Form 8867, Paid Preparer's Earned 
Income Credit Checklist, or an equivalent form. The completion of the checklist must be based on 
information provided by the taxpayer or reasonably obtained by the preparer. Treas. Reg. § 1.6695-2(b)(1) 
(2000). 
63 Book, Role of Preparers, supra note 18, at 71. 
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B. RALS AND TAX COMPLIANCE 
While we may not know much about tax practitioners, we do know that the tax 
preparation industry as a whole has become, in some significant respects, “a vehicle for 
cross-marketing of non-tax goods and services.”65 RALs – one example of these non-tax 
products available from many paid preparers – are short-term loans secured by a 
taxpayer’s anticipated tax refund amount.  A taxpayer will borrow against the anticipated 
refund, and will be required to repay the loan regardless of the size of the actual refund 
amount.  The RAL lender issues the taxpayer the amount of the anticipated refund less 
any preparation fees, as well as any filing, finance, and processing charges.  The IRS 
refund is then transferred directly to the lender to pay back the loan.  RAL customers 
receive their money between two and six weeks faster than waiting for their refund 
check.66
The creation of RALs has opened up a major market niche67, with their popularity 
largely coming with the advent of the IRS’s e-filing program, and their use often 
associated with the receipt of EITC–generated refunds.68  RAL providers actually credit 
                                                                                                                                                 
64 See infra notes 65-118 and surrounding text. 
65 Tax Return Preparation Options for Taxpayers: Hearing Before the Senate Finance Committee, 109th 
Cong. 3 (Apr. 4, 2006) (written statements of Nina E. Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate).  For example, a 
number of used car dealers have entered the tax return preparation industry and issuing a RAL that can be 
used as a down payment on a car.  Id. 
66 The difference in time depends on how the taxpayer chooses to file their return and receive their refund.  
If the taxpayer chooses to file by paper, they can receive their refund in approximately five weeks through 
direct deposit, or six weeks by having a check mailed to them.  If the taxpayer chooses to e-file, they can 
receive their funds in approximately two weeks through direct deposit, or three weeks by choosing to have 
the check mailed to them.  2007 Nat’l Taxpayer Advocate Objectives Report to Congress vol. 2, at 13 
[hereinafter 2007 NTA Objectives]. 
67 Estimates for the 2006 tax filing season reveal that RALs provide a nearly $1 billion market, with $900 
million in loan fees and as much as $90 million in “other” fees being generated.  2008 NCLC Report, supra 
note 7, at 5-8. 
68 See supra note 8 and surrounding text. Block credits the popularity of RALs on several other factors as 
well, including that RALs meet seasonal needs by allowing customers a chance to get caught up on 
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RALs with spurring the e-filing program’s success, as obtaining a refund faster 
encouraged e-filing, , and served as the source of the preparers’ filing and related fees.69
RALs are regulated to a limited extent by the IRS and Treasury.  In addition to the 
regulations governing all paid preparers,70 the preparer may not also issue the RAL,71 
and all tax preparers providing electronic filing services are subject to the rules in the 
IRS’s Handbook for Authorized e-file Providers of Individual Income Tax Returns.72 
Because of this requirement that the preparer not also be the lender, preparers and lenders 
have developed different preparer-lender relationships, including per-RAL compensation 
arrangements and “participation” arrangements.73  The per-RAL compensation 
arrangement is simple: whenever a RAL is taken out, the preparer receives a flat fee from 
the lender, regardless of the size of the loan.74  The participation arrangement, however, 
is a bit more complex.  In these instances, the preparer “participates” in the loan by 
                                                                                                                                                 
financial obligations, provide a sense of closure at tax time (a time of year they argue is fraught with stress 
for many), and serve the unbanked, who would most likely not have access to other forms of credit.  Block 
Comments, supra note 16, at nn. 21, 37-39 and surrounding text. 
69 Id. 
70 For these regulations and requirements governing preparer conduct as well as their associated penalties, 
see supra note 49. 
71 Rev. Proc. 98-50, 1998-2 C.B. 368.  
72 I.R.S. Pub. 1345 (Nov. 2004).  This publication requires that any preparer issuing a RAL to 
 
[e]nsure taxpayers understand that by agreeing to a RAL or other financial product they will not 
receive their refund from the IRS as the IRS will send their refund to the financial institution; 
advise taxpayers that RALs are interest bearing loans and not a quicker way of receiving their 
refunds from the IRS; advise taxpayers that if a Direct Deposit is not received within the expected 
timeframe for whatever reason, the taxpayers may be liable to the lender for additional interest and 
other fees, as applicable for the RAL or other financial product . . . ; advise taxpayers of all fees 
and other known deductions to be paid from their refund and the remaining amount the taxpayers 
will actually receive; secure the taxpayer’s written consent . . . to disclose tax information to the 
lending financial institution in connection with an application for a RAL or other financial 
product; ensure that if it is also the return preparer that it is not a related taxpayer to the financial 
institution or other lender that makes a RAL or other financial product within the meaning of §267 
or §707A; and adhere to fee restrictions and advertising standards . . . . 
 
Id. at 44 (internal parentheses and bullet points omitted). 
73 See Pacific Capital Bancorp, Provider Comments on Proposed Rules Restricting Return Preparers’ 
Solicitation of RALs, TAX NOTES, May 2, 2008, LEXIS, 2008 TNT 86-25 [hereinafter Pacific Comments]. 
74 Id. 
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purchasing a less than 50% share of the loan.75  This arrangement seems to rest on an 
interpretation of Revenue Procedure 98-50 that the preparer is not the lender so long as it 
does not own a majority share in the loan.76
Over time, RAL providers have come under fire from consumer advocates,77 
elected officials,78 and IRS officials.79  The criticisms of RALs have focused on both a 
social policy standpoint and a tax compliance standpoint. This section will focus on the 
debate over RALs’ effect on tax compliance.80
Because RALs are typically capped at the amount of the anticipated refund, the 
IRS and the National Taxpayer Advocate have raised concerns about what kind of 
incentives this creates in preparing returns.81  In response to these concerns, the 
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, sought comments to determine to what 
degree RALs and other similar products should be regulated.82  The IRS and Treasury 
asked specifically: “If RALs and certain other products create a direct financial incentive 
for preparers to inflate tax refunds, are there alternative approaches that would eliminate 
or reduce this incentive?”83  The rule on which the IRS and Treasury were seeking 
                                                 
75 Refund Anticipation Loans: Oversight of the Industry, Cross-Collection Techniques, and Payment 
Alternatives, in Nat’l Taxpayer Advocate, 2005 Annual Report to Congress, at 172 [hereinafter 2005 NTA 
Report]. 
76 Engerman, supra note 9, at 38-39. 
77 “RALs drain hundreds of millions of dollars from the pockets of consumers and the U.S. Treasury.” 2008 
NCLC Report at 4.  “RALs contribute to tax fraud.”  Id. at 20.  “RALs allow them [fraudsters] to get the 
money for their fraudulent returns before the fraud can be detected by the IRS.”  Id. at 26 (internal 
quotation marks omitted, brackets original). 
78 “RALs drain too many resources away from earned income tax credit families that cannot afford to be 
fleeced by these excessively priced predatory products.”  Press Release, Sen. Daniel Akaka, National 
Taxpayer Advocate Urges IRS to Reevaluate Policies That Facilitate Refund Anticipation Loans (July 13, 
2006) (on file with author). 
79 “RAL fees combined with return preparation and electronic filing fees significantly reduce a taxpayer’s 
refund.”  2005 NTA Report, supra note 75, at 163. 
80 For a discussion of the social policy debate over RALs, see supra note 16. 
81 Guidance Regarding Marketing of Refund Anticipation Loans, 73 Fed. Reg. 1131 (Jan. 8, 2008). 
82 Id. 
83 Id.  The IRS and Treasury also asked: “Are there other products that present significant concerns for tax 
compliance . . . that should be addressed by regulation?”  Id. 
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guidance would prohibit the use of information obtained during the tax preparation 
process for the purpose of marketing any product.84  This new rule would effectively 
keep preparers from initiating any marketing of RALs.85
RAL critics argue that both of types of preparer-lender arrangements provide 
financial incentives to inflate refund claims.86  The critics first contend that preparers 
have an incentive to push RALs, which means taking measures to promote the loans.87  
And since bigger refunds may make it more likely that the taxpayer will take out a RAL – 
as they are better able to absorb the preparation and finance charges – the preparer is 
better served by inflating the refund amount.88  Inflating the claim is even more tempting, 
critics say, when the preparer is a retailer89 (e.g., used car dealer) and not a professional 
preparer (e.g., H&R Block employee), as retailers might encourage the RAL customer to 
spend the RAL proceeds in their shops.90  A bigger refund, therefore, means a bigger 
down payment on a car for the retailer, or bigger check cashing fees for the check cashing 
shop.91
Participation interests are of even more concern to RAL critics.  Though the IRS 
prohibits return preparers from receiving a fee that is contingent on the amount of the 
refund,92 preparers seem to be “accomplishing on an aggregate basis what they are 
prevented from doing on an individual loan basis.”93  This is accomplished because the 
                                                 
84 Id. 
85 Pacific Comments, supra note 73. 
86 NCLC Comments, supra note 10, at 4. 
87 Id. at 22. 
88 Id. at 22-23. 
89 See GAO RAL Report, supra note 8, at 5-14 (providing examples of retailers offering tax preparation 
services and RALs). 
90 NCLC Comments, supra note 10, at 23. 
91 Id. 
92 I.R.S. Pub. 1345, at 45 (Nov. 2004). 
93 2007 NTA Objectives, supra note 66, at 7. 
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amount received is not a preparation “fee,” but the payment scheme between some 
preparers and lenders rewards preparers on the total amount of facilitated RALs. 94
While hard data on the effect RALs have on compliance is scarce, critics note a 
correlation between audit adjustment rates and RAL indicators.95 Data from 2004 
suggests that returns claiming eligibility for the EITC with RAL indicators had an 
average adjustment over $300 higher than those without RAL indicators, and had a 14% 
lower no-change percentage.96  Furthermore, in 2004, the Director of the IRS Criminal 
Investigation Division’s Refund Crimes Unit found that 80% of fraudulent e-filed returns 
are tied to RALs.97  Critics argue that this correlation shows that RALs incentivize tax 
fraud.98
RAL critics go on to say that RALs not only provide the preparer with incentives 
to inflate claims, but provide the taxpayer with an invitation to act improperly as well.99  
A 1993 report on the IRS’s e-filing program pays particular attention to the fact that 
RALs shorten the “exposure period” for the fraudster – the time between the dishonest 
act and the payoff.100  The report notes that the length of time between the act of fraud 
                                                 
94 2007 NTA Report, supra note 54, at 95; Engerman, supra note 9, at 38. 
95 2007 NTA Report, supra note 54, at 88.  A RAL indicator is a notation on an IRS tax account that 
indicates that the taxpayer applied for (but not necessarily received) a RAL.  See TREASURY INSPECTOR 
GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, MANY TAXPAYERS WHO OBTAIN REFUND ANTICIPATION LOANS 
COULD BENEFIT FROM FREE TAX PREPARATION SERVICES n.2 (August 29, 2008, Reference Number: 2008-
40-170). 
96 The data shows that average adjustment for EITC claims with RAL indicators was $3,264, while it was 
$2,941 for those without RAL indicators.  Those returns associated with RALs had a no-change rate of 
13%, while those not associated with RALs has a no-change rate of 27%.  Id.  “No-change” refers to those 
cases where the IRS has initiated an audit, but made no proposed assessment against the taxpayer. 
97 Allen Kenney, IRS Official Shines Spotlight on E-Filing Fraud, TAX NOTES, July 7, 2004, LEXIS, 2004 
TNT 130-4. 
98 See NCLC Comments, supra note 10, at 23-25. The National Consumer Law Center urges that on the 
demand side of the equation, it is the most popular feature of RALs – speed – that promotes tax fraud.  Id. 
at 25-26. 
99 See id. at 20-23, 25-26 (analyzing incentives for preparers to inflate refund claims as well as incentives 
for demand-driven tax fraud). 
100 Malcolm Sparrow, 1993 Report on IRS Vulnerability to Refund Fraud, TAX NOTES, Feb. 20, 1996, 
LEXIS, 96 TNT 35-51, at § 2.3.1. 
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and its payoff is one of the principal deterrents or inducers of fraud – the shorter the 
exposure period, the more appealing fraud becomes.101
If in fact the presence of RALs exacerbates improper taxpayer behavior, critics 
note that the preparers have no incentive to implement fraud control measures beyond 
IRS enforcement.102  In fact, preparers seem to only have the incentives to predict IRS 
behavior.103  As the success of the RAL industry largely rests on the volume of RALs, 
any fraud control beyond expected IRS enforcement would cut into that volume, 
ultimately affecting profits.104
RAL providers, on the other hand, criticize the proposed rule.105  RAL providers 
first urge that the RAL industry is already properly regulated.106  They go on to suggest 
that, for any problems that might exist, effective enforcement of these existing regulations 
is a better course of action than adopting a rule that would potentially impose significant 
additional costs for these products.107
Addressing the concerns over whether or not RALs create an incentive to inflate 
refund claims, the providers say that these concerns are completely unfounded.108  RAL 
proponents first point to the lack of evidence that preparers and RALs have any causal 
                                                 
101 “’Easy money fast’ is a much more attractive proposition for fraud perpetrators than ‘easy 
money...which you should get in six weeks.’”  Id.  Cf. Dean Beeby, People Who File Electronically More 
Likely to Cheat: Report, THE CANADIAN PRESS, Aug. 10, 2008 (discussing internal report by Canada 
Revenue Agency comparing error rates among those who e-file and those who file paper returns). 
102 NCLC Comments, supra note 10, at 27-29. 
103 Sparrow, supra note 100, at § 6.6. 
104 NCLC Comments, supra note 10, at 28-29. 
105 See generally Block Comments, supra note 16; Pacific Comments, supra note 73. 
106 IRS rules require that the return preparer not be the lender, and that a flat fee be charged for preparation 
– the fees received by preparers cannot be contingent upon the amount of the refund claim.  See Block 
Comments, supra note 16, at nn.48-50 and surrounding text. 
107 See id. at § text surrounding note 114-117, where Block argues that the separation of the preparation and 
product sales envisioned in the ANPR would result in “unduly costly” changes and inhibit the use of such 
products . I note that the National Taxpayer Advocate believes that the ANPR would not inhibit the use of 
the product. See 2007 NTA Report, supra note 54, at 83, 90.  
108 See id. at § 5A; Pacific Comments, supra note 73. 
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relationship to tax noncompliance.109  They urge that the concerns over preparer-initiated 
noncompliance are based on unsubstantiated claims and hypothetical scenarios put forth 
by their critics and that the comments “bear little resemblance to the actual value that 
RALs provide to consumers.”110  
RAL proponents emphasize the common interest in tax compliance between the 
preparer and the IRS.111  There are numerous regulations that preparers must comply 
with, all directed at ensuring compliance.112  Furthermore, several arrangements between 
preparers and lenders actually reward the preparer for a low default rate by giving them 
additional compensation.113  All of this serves as an incentive to comply with the tax law, 
proponents say.114  Furthermore, the participation agreements likewise create the same 
incentive, as the participating preparer shares in both the gains and the losses achieved by 
RALs.115
The largest chain preparer and facilitator of RALs, H&R Block, goes on to say 
that even without RALs preparers are already encouraged by the profit motive to 
maximize the possible refund or minimize tax liability.116  The marginal profits of RALs 
simply do not provide any incentives that do not already exist because of the profit 
motive already present in the industry.117  Block urges that more research must be done 
                                                 
109 Block Comments, supra note 16, at § 2A. 
110 Pacific Comments, supra note 73. 
111 See id. at nn.87-88 and surrounding text. 
112 For examples of these regulations, see supra note 50. 
113 For example, SBBT, the bank affiliated with Jackson Hewitt, gives preparers an extra $1 per-RAL if 
losses from that preparer were less than 1%, with an additional $1 for every 25 basis points below 1%.  
Pacific Comments, supra note 73. 
114 Id.  
115 Id. 
116 Block Comments, supra note 16, at § 5A. 
117 Block conducted an inquiry into the possibility that RALs drive tax fraud using internal data., Block 
chose to look at the rates of amended returns as an indicator of who receives IRS letters.  Block found that 
non-RAL returns actually had a higher change rate than returns with RAL indicators.  They further found 
that the size of the refund, the client’s adjusted gross income, and the client’s age to be more predictive of 
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into the effect of RALs on tax compliance, and recommends that the IRS further enforce 
existing laws before additionally regulating or restricting RALs.118
 
IV. THE INCENTIVE TO PROMOTE AND DETECT ERROR 
 
 As the IRS noted, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that at the retail level 
the presence of RALS is encouraging preparers to become the type of preparer that either 
promotes noncompliance119 or does little in the way to prevent noncompliance that 
derives from improper taxpayer conduct.120  The lack of understanding and research in 
this area hampers policymakers from taking regulatory action purely based upon a 
compliance rationale. For example, if research suggested that the marginal profit 
associated with RALs, either directly or in conjunction with its effect from the sale of 
services or products fueled by the RAL, produced preparers more willing to actively 
engage in noncompliance,121 then this would suggest firm policy options, including 
possibly limiting profits associated with RALs122 or preventing the preparation of returns 
                                                                                                                                                 
amendments than the presence of RALs.  This data is certainly not conclusive, as individuals who have 
erroneously taken a position on a tax return and received a correspondence examination letter may not file 
and amended return. They would likely agree with the IRS’s proposed assessment and sign a consent form 
to allow immediate assessment or fail to respond to the letter, which would ultimately result in the IRS 
assessing the change reflected in the correspondence. Block candidly recognizes the limits of its data, and I 
agree that it does “seem[] clear that further research is necessary before determining that RALs are a causal 
factor for tax fraud.”  Id. at nn.100-02 and surrounding text. 
118 Id. at nn.101-02 and surrounding text. 
119 IRS COMMENTS, in 2007 NTA Report, supra note 54, at 90-91.  For types of noncompliance, see supra 
note 57 and surrounding text. 
120 Noncompliance that, for example, derives from facilitating practitioners, indifferent practitioners, 
incompetent or unsophisticated practitioners, and reasonably unknowing practitioners (types 3 through 6 
practitioners, above) faced with demand-driven noncompliance. See supra note 63 and surrounding text. 
121 In particular, as I identify above, the inquiry should consider whether RALs produce preparers who are 
more willing to shirk on their due diligence responsibilities, aid and abet noncompliance, facilitation of 
future noncompliance, and directed noncompliance (types 4 through 7 noncompliance).  See supra note 57 
and surrounding text. 
122 For example, recent legislation caps the annual percentage rate on loans extended to military personnel 
at 36%.  John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, 10 U.S.C. § 987 (2006). 
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from those whose principal source of revenues derives from the sale of unrelated services 
or products. 
Even if one believes that the evidence is insufficient regarding the effect on 
preparers’ willingness to act improperly, or act in a manner to prevent taxpayers from 
acting improperly, it seems probable that the additional speed associated with RALs 
might embolden improper taxpayer behavior.  This is by no means proven, but if the 
speed associated with RALs increases the propensity of taxpayers to take improper 
positions on tax returns, preparers and banks have a common incentive in detecting error 
among claimants, as RAL facilitators stated in comments in response to the ANPR.123  
This statement is correct to a limited extent.  Consider that claimants seeking a refund 
draw IRS scrutiny in a few ways.  First, the returns are subject to refund offset against 
delinquent state or federal taxes, unpaid student loans, child support, and certain other 
debts.  This non-return specific liability is subject to detection through the IRS’s Debt 
Indicator (DI) program, and that information is detected by the IRS and shared with 
preparers.124  Though the DI offsets have implications for the unpaid portion of the tax 
                                                 
123 Pacific Comments supra note 73; Block Comments, supra note 16, at n.88 and surrounding text.  It is 
noteworthy, however, that the preparer’s interest is not perfectly aligned with the IRS’s, as the preparer 
does not generally face adverse economic consequences with filing returns not associated with a RAL that 
will subsequently face pre-refund audit. This is so as a general matter, but not necessarily so all the time 
because the preparer may in fact incur additional costs associated with the filing of an erroneous non RAL 
refund return, as it is possible that the return may draw IRS scrutiny on the preparer’s conduct. The 
exception to this statement appears to be with claimants who seek a refund anticipation check (RAC). A 
RAC is a non-loan bank product that allows a claimant without a bank account to open a dummy account 
whereby the IRS refund is directly deposited.  The preparer will issue the refund in a check or pre-loaded 
debit card, less preparation and bank account fees.  2005 NTA Report, supra note 75, at 165. This speeds 
the refund time to about one to two-weeks, compared with 48 hours for a RAL and about 5-6 weeks for 
paper return.  Block Comments, supra note 16, at 18. 
124 Taxpayer NTA 2007 Objectives, supra note 66, at 8-10.  Financial Management Services (FMS) has 
authority pursuant to I.R.C. § 6402(d) to offset any taxpayer’s debt to federal agencies (i.e. unpaid taxes, 
child support, student loans, etc.) against the taxpayer’s refund.  The IRS updates its systems to reflect 
these debts in the Debt Indicator (DI).  The Debt Indicator has an entry for every taxpayer that indicates 
one of four statuses: no outstanding liability (N), IRS debt (I), FMS debt (F), or both IRS and FMS debt 
(B).  Id. at 8. 
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gap, DI indicators are not related to the incentives for error on the particular return.125  
Claimants alerted of DI problems may not file their returns, and would in fact have an 
incentive to share tax benefits to which they are entitled with other family members who 
may have earned income and be in a position to avail themselves of family status benefits 
and improperly claim a refund that would qualify them for a RAL.126 Those claimants 
who end up triggering a DI indicator will not be issued a RAL, lest the loan will likely 
default, as the IRS would intercept the refund which would have been used to pay back 
the loan and apply the money to the debt.  While the DI is extremely important for the 
economic viability of RALs127, it is not likely particularly significant as a tool of 
providing preparers with incentives to detect potential claimant error. 
The real overlap in IRS and preparer detection incentives relates to ensuring that 
the return associated with a RAL is not subject to a pre-refund audit.128  If a refund is 
frozen in a pre-refund audit, there is a significant risk of RAL default.129  Through the 
practice of cross-collection in subsequent years the industry has taken controversial steps 
to minimize the effect of RAL defaults130, the risk of default carries significant costs and 
                                                 
125 The IRS can offset unpaid taxes against the taxpayer’s refund pursuant to section 6402.  I.R.C. § 6402 
(2000). 
126 For a discussion of how these tax benefits may be shared and passed on, see Book, Freakonomics, supra 
note 15, at 1176-84. 
127 In 1994 the IRS terminated the DI due to concerns over filing fraud.  After the DI was dropped, RAL 
volume dropped significantly.  At H&R Block, for example, RAL volume was cut from 5.5 million to 2.35 
million.  When the DI was reinstated in 1999, RAL volume jumped.  For the 2006 filing season (the most 
current year for which the IRS has data), approximately 9 million RALs were issued.  2008 NCLC Report, 
supra note 7, at 6; NCLC Comments, supra note 10, at 26. 
128 Engerman, supra note 9, at 33 (“It is important to note that the incentive on the preparer is to avoid pre-
refund IRS examination, not all EITC overclaims.”); Pacific Comments, supra note 73; Block Comments, 
supra note 16, at §5A (noting that RAL lenders often tie compensation to performance – preparers receive 
no compensation if the IRS does not issue a refund on a tax return that the preparer filed). 
129 Pacific Comments, supra note 73 (“If tax funds are improperly inflated, as the lender, we are the party 
that incurs the potential losses when the IRS pays a refund that is less than requested on the return.”). 
130 Standard RAL and RAC contracts contain a cross-collection provision, allowing lenders to collect on 
subsequent RALs and RACs taken out by defaulting customers.  See Engerman, supra note 9, at 31.  The 
major RAL lenders sign reciprocal agreements whereby they will withhold and pay back defaulted RALs 
before issuing the funds to the customer.  2007 NTA Objectives, supra note 66, at 10.  The Taxpayer 
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places preparer and IRS error detection interests in close alignment.  Preparers’ 
compensation arrangements with RAL providers are often closely tied to default rates131, 
and unlike returns that trigger DI notice, there is no advance notification associated with 
these returns. .  
The interests of preparers and the IRS are least closely aligned when one 
considers IRS post-refund error detection and audits, especially given how few IRS civil 
or criminal compliance efforts are focused on the preparer.132  At that point the preparer 
has received its fees, and the individual who is subject to the audit has received the RAL 
proceeds.  IRS compliance activities at this time typically target the taxpayers, and the 
effect of an examination or audit resulting in an assessment is a liability to the IRS that 
results in the possibility of administrative collection activities, including offset of future 
refunds, the filing of a federal tax lien, or administrative collection (like a levy) targeting 
wages, savings and even certain types of federal benefits.133 While IRS compliance 
                                                                                                                                                 
Advocate has expressed concern that this practice might be violating the Fair Debt Collection Practices 
Act, which requires collectors to inform consumers that the collector is attempting to collect outstanding 
debt, so as to give the consumer the opportunity to dispute the validity of the debt.  Id. at 10-11.  Given that 
these cross-collection provisions minimize preparers’ risk of loss from default, they decrease the common 
incentive to detect erroneous EITC claimants. 
131 Pacific Comments, supra note 73, at 3; Engerman, supra note 9, at 32-33. 
132 See Engerman, supra note 9, at 35 (noting that IRS policies governing paid preparers largely inoculate 
the preparers from being held liable for taxpayer misconduct which they were unable to detect).  See 
generally TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, WHILE DOCUMENTATION WAS NOT 
AVAILABLE TO FULLY ASSESS THE RETURN PREPARER PROGRAM, IDENTIFICATION AND PROCESSING OF 
PREPARER PENALTIES CAN BE IMPROVED (2008-30-147, July 29, 2008) [hereinafter TIGTA PREPARER 
PROGRAM ASSESSMENT] (discussing several failures to follow IRS guidelines when investigating suspected 
preparer penalties for misconduct).  However, there have recently been some high-profile injunction cases 
brought by the IRS.  The most prominent among these is a civil enforcement action recently brought by the 
Justice Department against five Jackson Hewitt franchisees operating 125 offices for their role in filing 
false refund claims totaling $70 million.  See Complaint, United States v. Smart Tax of Georgia, Inc., 
1:07CV-0747 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 2, 2007); Complaint, United States v. Smart Tax, Inc., 07C-1802 (N.D. Ill. 
Apr. 2, 2007); Complaint, United States v. So Far, Inc., Civ. No. 2:07-cv-11460 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 2, 2007); 
Complaint, United States v. Smart Tax of North Carolina, Inc., Civ. No 5:07-cv-00125-FL (E.D.N.C. Apr. 
2, 2007).  All of these complaints are available at http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/txdv07215.htm. 
133 “[E]xaminations that take place post-refund are entirely irrelevant to the lender [of RALs] and preparer, 
although the taxpayer will be subject to an assessment by the IRS in the amount of the overpayment.  
Engerman, supra note 9, at 33. 
 26
activities can also focus on the actions of preparers, IRS scrutiny on them has been 
relatively light,134 though there have been some high profile civil injunction cases 
brought against egregious cases of preparer misconduct.135
If the incentives between preparers and the IRS are not as closely aligned as RAL 
proponents suggest, then one possible policy option is to impose additional costs on 
preparers to more closely align those interests. One approach could involve an even 
greater due diligence requirement that is associated with the EITC general, and RALs in 
particular. This heightened due diligence would build on existing rules that impose 
additional obligations on preparers who  prepare and file returns claiming the EITC, and 
might explicitly require preparers to take a more assertive role in perusing documents or 
attesting to the eligibility for a refund.136 One can question whether it is appropriate for 
the IRS to effectively outsource error detection to third-party preparers in the manner that 
I and others have suggested137, but given the significant benefits and big business (and 
profits) associated with this segment of the return preparation industry, and the billions of 
dollars in improperly claimed refunds associated with returns that are prepared by paid 
preparers, it is legitimate to shift additional costs to those who may be able to prevent 
erroneous claims before they are paid. As the banks know well, once the dollars are paid 
                                                 
134 Id. at 35; Block comments, supra note 16, at n.101 and surrounding text; TIGTA, PREPARER PROGRAM 
ASSESSMENT, supra note 132, at 5-6 (citing instances where IRS agents failed to follow penalty procedures 
when investigating suspected preparer misconduct). 
135 See supra note 132. 
136 See Book, Freakonomics, supra note 15, at 1183-84 (suggesting similar due diligence requirements for 
preparers filing EITC claims for clients). 
137 See Leslie Book, Preventing the Hybrid from Backfiring: Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor 
Through the Tax System, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 1103, 1146-49 (2006) (proposing a more stringent set of due 
diligence requirements for preparers); Taxpayer Advocate, Federal Tax Return Preparers: Oversight and 
Compliance, 2003 Taxpayer Advocate Annual Report to Congress 272 (proposing imposing stiffer 
penalties for noncompliant preparers); Lawrence Gibbs, Former Comm’r, Internal Revenue Serv., Panelist 
at the Janet R. Spragens Memorial Symposium: Low-Income Workers and the Federal Tax System (Feb. 
23, 2007) (placing tax clinics in the category of government outsourcing). 
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out, it is not likely that there will be a recovery138, and post-refund detection of these 
claimants does little in the way of reducing the tax gap.  The key here is calibrating the ex 
ante incentives to ensure a more effective detection and prevention of claimant error in 
the private sector, while at the same time not ratcheting up costs for preparation so that 
the rules divert significant more dollars away from the intended beneficiaries. 
For the most part, the evidence (as scant as it is) suggests that RALs exist because 
taxpayers who have acted in some ways  irrationally by overwithholding or failing to 
claim advanced credits139, compound that irrationality by paying high fees to then get 
access to that money in an expedited fashion. There are significant non tax compliance 
policy issues associated with whether these products should be available.140  The purpose 
of this article, however, is to focus on the issue from a tax gap perspective.   Banks and 
preparers make money on this product.  Absent additional evidence, the fact that 
preparers and banks make money off the product does not necessarily create the kind of 
connection to noncompliance that warrants a banning of that product solely on the basis 
of the truism that people sometimes act improperly when they can earn money. Research 
is needed to specifically consider whether the added speed associated with RALs 
                                                 
138 RAL lenders actually “charge-off” any RALs not repaid within ninety days.  While a large portion of 
these funds are recovered, it is most likely due to post-examination release of EITC funds.  See Engerman, 
supra note 9, at 31. 
139 Cf. Michael S. Barr and Jane K. Dokko, Tax Filing Experiences and Withholding Preferences of Low- 
and Moderate-Income Households: Preliminary Evidence From a New Study, at 204-05 in RECENT 
RESEARCH ON TAX ADMINISTRATION AND COMPLIANCE: SPECIAL PAPERS GIVEN AT THE 2006 IRS 
RESEARCH CONFERENCE, June 14-15, 2006 (noting that approximately 80% of taxpayers would like to use 
the withholding system to save); J. Mark Iwry, Using Tax Refunds to Increase Savings and Retirement 
Security 9 (The Retirement Security Project) (2006) (“[A]t least for many households, the current level of 
withholding is not ‘overwithholding,’ but a deliberate method of forced savings. . . .”); Block Comments, 
supra note 16, at 25 (making mention of “the . . . phenomenon of Americans who value their tax refund as 
their annual bonus and focus the tax filing event on the receipt of the refund.”). 
140 For a discussion the players in this debate and their various arguments, see supra note 16. 
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emboldens claimants to act inappropriately and boost demand driven noncompliance141, 
or whether the additional profits associated with the facilitating of RALs encourages 
inappropriate preparer conduct.142
The debate in this area is characterized by some imprecise advocacy.  Pro RAL 
proponents and industry segments who have made the claim that RALs help minimize 
program error have overstated their claim given how limited the overlapping interests 
between the government and preparers are.  Likewise, opponents of RALs, who raise 
compliance as one (among many) of the policy reasons why the product should be further 
regulated or banned, have overstated their case, given that once one accepts that customer 
satisfaction often flows to commercial preparers who facilitate refunds (whether refunds 
are speedy or slow), there will be incentives for preparers to either encourage 
noncompliance or turn a blind eye toward taxpayer misconduct.  
The largest private income tax return preparer, H&R Block, likewise overstates its 
case, and analyzes the incentives from a different perspective, noting that independent of 
RALs, given the importance of the $250 billion in annual tax refunds, preparers have an 
incentive to deliver the “maximum possible refund (or lowest tax liability) through 
entirely lawful means.”143  The problem with this statement is that ,meaningful IRS 
enforcement or due diligence rules that more forcefully require preparer disclosure of the 
source of information backstopping an  improper claim are, quite simply, absent.144 So 
                                                 
141 See Sparrow, supra note 100, at §2.3.1 (“The exposure period – the time that elapses between the 
carrying out of a dishonest act and the receipt of the financial payoff from that act – is one of the most 
powerful deterrents for fraud available.”). 
142 Such conduct would be along the lines of facilitated noncompliance (both one-time and on a continual 
basis), advising taxpayers how to misstate or omit income, claim inappropriate or excessive deductions or 
credits, or directed noncompliance. See supra note 57 and surrounding text. 
143 Block Comments, supra note 16, at n.89 and surrounding text. 
144 Book, Freakonomics, supra note 15, at 1183-84; Book, Role of Preparers, supra note 18, at 49-50, 74 
(discussing that research will better enable policymakers to fashion rules that will incentivize compliance); 
 29
long as compliance directed at preparers is low, and if there are significant amount of 
taxpayers erroneously receiving refunds, some preparers may have the incentive to retain 
or attract new clients through means that not necessarily lawful, or, at a minimum, not 
reflective of best practice in terms of detecting and preventing error. 
While RALs create additional profits, and may in fact allow fringe preparers145 to 
prey even further on the sale of non-tax products, it is not clear that marginal RAL profit 
drives inappropriate preparer conduct among those whose principal business is the 
preparation of tax returns. Perhaps it does, and it seems more likely given incentives in 
the fringe preparer industry where RALs fuel purchases of high margin products146, but 
more in the way of evidence is needed if using tax compliance as justification for limiting 
or banning a product that many individuals use, and at least some research suggests 
results in significant customer satisfaction.147
Ultimately, the debate surrounding RALS surrounds in some ways the battle over 
professionalizing the return preparer industry.  Calls to regulate and license preparers148 
                                                                                                                                                 
Taxpayer Advocate, Regulation of Federal Tax Return Preparers, FY 2002 Taxpayer Advocate Annual 
Report to Con., at 224-25 [hereinafter 2002 NTA Report] (noting the inadequacies of the due diligence 
requirements). 
145 Fringe preparers are tax return preparers whose primary business is not a financial service or tax return 
preparation.  The term includes several different players.  Fringe preparers are “businesses that are 
historically associated with the exploitation of consumers, such as payday loan stores, check cashers, and 
used car dealers . . . [s]ome retailers, such as jewelry and furniture stores, are fringe preparers [as well].”  
NCLC Comments, supra note 10, at 29. 
146 For example, car dealers have been known to offer tax preparation services, issue a RAL, and then 
encourage the customer to spend the proceeds on a down payment for a car.  Several concerns have been 
raised about the conflict of interests that exists in situations like these.  See id.; 2008 NCLC Report, supra 
note 7, at 31; 2007 NTA Report, supra note 54, at 86. 
147 GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN, CONSUMER USE OF TAX REFUND ANTICIPATION LOANS 67 (GEO. U. 
MCDONOUGH SCH. OF BUS.) (April, 2005).  It is worth noting, though, that this study was partially funded 
by Jackson Hewitt.  Id. at iv. 
148 2002 NTA Report, supra note 144, at 216-30.  California has adopted a law requiring certification of 
federal and state tax return preparers.  Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22255.  Similarly, Oregon regulates paid 
preparers, and Maryland has likewise adopted new provisions regulating preparers.  Or. Admin. R. 800-
015-010 (1) (2002). For a review of the possible positive effects of the state legislation, see GOVERNMENT 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TAX PREPARERS: OREGON’S REGULATORY REGIME MAY LEAD TO IMPROVED 
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are based in part upon a desire to emphasize the gatekeeper role that professionals play in 
the marketplace.149  To the extent that this debate highlights the positive role that 
preparers can play in reducing one important component of the tax gap, then this 
advances the issue considerably. Even H&R Block has called for increasing the research 
into RAL’s possible causation of fraud and possibly increasing criminal investigations of 
preparers who may be involved with facilitating improper EITC claims.150  The relative 
lack of information regarding paid preparers151 suggests the need for detailed analysis 
examining error rates among similarly situated returns that differ materially only through 
the purchase of a bank product, and quantitative analysis of error rates among different 
types of return preparers.  In addition, a more robust qualitative examination of the effect 
that RALs or related products have on preparer conduct through expanded use of mystery 
shoppers and other approaches that will gauge the dynamic relationship between 
preparers and taxpayers will also help researchers understand the influence of products 
like RALs on the willingness of preparers and taxpayers alike to act improperly is 
needed.152
The lack of data, however, does not detract from the inadequacy of the IRS’s 
current enforcement regime insofar as that regime can target return preparers. Given the 
                                                                                                                                                 
FEDERAL TAX RETURN ACCURACY AND PROVIDES A POSSIBLE MODEL FOR NATIONAL REGULATION 7 
(GAO-08-781, Aug., 2008) 
149 Tax preparers play a gate-keeping role in the tax compliance system.  The preparers perform their tasks 
of preparing the tax forms, identifying items that affect the taxpayer’s liability and advise their clients on 
resolving any uncertainty as to the tax consequences of ambiguous items.  In doing so the preparers, at least 
in theory, push their clients towards complying with the tax law.  See Book, Role of Preparers, supra note 
18, at 52.  See also, 2002 NTA Report, supra note 144, at 224. 
150 Block Comments, supra note 16, at nn.100-02 and surrounding text. 
151 See generally Book, Role of Preparers, supra note 18. 
152 See id. at 56 (noting that compliance research has been focused on quantitative measurement, providing 
a body of research that lacks any context to put it in); McKerchar, supra note 61, at 242 (emphasizing the 
importance of identifying the various typologies of noncompliance and urging that additional studies be 
made relating to taxpayer and preparer behavior). 
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paucity of criminal investigations and civil injunctions on questionable preparers153, it 
seems prudent to enforce in a more robust fashion current rules before broadly and 
perhaps crudely limiting demand for a product that has not necessarily been driving the 
high program error rates. 
 
V. CHANGING INCENTIVES, REWARDING CORPORATE BEHAVIOR AND THE POWER OF 
NORMS: RESPONSIVE REGULATION 
 In addition to considering the need for additional research to backstop compliance 
and a more robust effort to enforce current rules, the IRS would benefit from the insights 
offered in the literature surrounding responsive regulation.  Responsive regulation is the 
idea that regulators must be responsive to the conduct of those they seek to regulate.154  
This means that when a regulator is “deciding whether a more or less 
interventionist response is required” they must consider those who will be controlled by 
the regulations.155  “Responsive regulation is not ‘a clearly defined program or set of 
perceptions concerning the best way to regulate’ but rather a method that advances the 
proposition that regulation should be context-dependant.”156  Responsive regulation sets 
                                                 
153 Over the last three years, an average of only 270 investigations have been opened up under the 
Questionable Refund Program, and only 211 under the Abusive Return Preparers Program.  Block 
Comments, supra note 16, at 100-01 and surrounding text. 
154 IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION 
DEBATE [pincite?] (1992).  See also Dennis Ventry, The Collision of Tax and Welfare Politics: The 
Political History of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 1969-99, 53 Nat’l Tax J. 1017 (“[P]olicy alternatives, 
regardless of their theoretical or analytical appeal, will have to complement rather than conflict with social 
and cultural forces to prove successful.”); David Schizer, Enlisting the Tax Bar, 59 Tax L. Rev. 331 
(calling on an increase in sanctions on practitioners focusing on advisors role in blessing a challenged 
transaction). 
155 Valerie Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation and Taxation: Introduction, 29 Law & Pol’y 3, 4 (2007) 
[hereinafter Valerie Braithwaite, Introduction]. 
156 Sagit Leviner, A New Era of Tax Enforcement: From ‘Big Stick’ to Responsive Regulation, at 264 in 
RECENT RESEARCH ON TAX ADMINISTRATION AND COMPLIANCE: SPECIAL PAPERS GIVEN AT THE 2006 IRS 
RESEARCH CONFERENCE, June 14-15, 2006, (quoting Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 154) (internal 
footnotes omitted). 
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forth a regulatory pyramid with a “series of options that a tax authority might use to win 
compliance, sequenced from the least intrusive at the bottom to the most intrusive at the 
top.”157
“The idea is that an authority that is legitimate and that is engaging seriously with 
the democratic will of the people does not need coercion at the top of the pyramid to win 
compliance in most cases.”158  The United States current tax administration has a 
“command-and-control operational system to accomplish their mission of catching ‘the 
scoundrels’ who do not pay their tax.”159  This system does not deal well with the 
contestation that arises from a voluntary system, where taxpayers can argue about how 
much is owed.160  As a result, responsive regulation is becoming an alternative for 
organizing tax administrations, although it may be resource intensive.161
                                                 
157 Valerie Braithwaite, Introduction, supra note 155, at 4. 
  
 
Id. 
158 Id. (emphasis original). 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
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Responsive regulation has “several critical elements to its implementation:162” 
It refers to the practice of (a) influencing the flow of events (b) 
through systematic, fairly directed and fully explained disapproval 
(c) that is respectful of regulatees, helpful in filling information 
gaps and attentive to opposing or resisting arguments, (d) yet firm 
in administering sanctions (e) that will escalate in intensity in 
response to the absence of genuine effort on the part of the 
regulatee to meet the required standards.163
 
Tax administrations usually operate on the presumption that tax law will influence 
the flow of events when sanctions are sufficiently certain and severe to offset the gains of 
non-compliance.164  Responsive regulation on the other hand “assumes that there is a 
responsible moral self that can be drawn out by a good regulator and that will enable 
offenders to change their ways and self-regulate more effectively in the future.”165
The responsive regulation approach offers hope in changing the previously binary 
view of preparers associated with the EITC as either facilitators of fraud, or possible case 
workers to be employed in the traditional benefits’ model.166  Administrators should 
emphasize explicitly what is implicit in the current arrangement with preparers: that there 
is a partnership between taxpayers, preparers and the government. The need to reward 
good behavior, rather than just ferret out bad actors, could change the dynamic in the 
partnership, and contribute to a reinforcing dynamic of compliance.167
                                                 
162 JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION (Oxford University Press) 
(2002)[Needs pincite]. 
163 Valerie Braithwaite, Introduction, supra note 155, at 5. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 9. 
166 See Engerman, supra note 9, at 11-15 (discussing the traditional caseworker model for public assistance 
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Shelter Norm Compliance, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 961, 1012-13 (2006) (describing the Compliance 
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As others have written, the trick is to encourage positive behavior.168  This may 
be difficult if other actors are behaving improperly, but there are tools that the IRS and 
Congress can use to steer claimants toward better preparers, including favored refund 
time, differing access to the DI program, differing recordkeeping or due diligence 
requirements, or explicit discretion from Congress for the IRS to modify or waive certain 
requirements or penalties for preparers who meet certain low error thresholds.169
An interesting example of how the IRS can travel through the responsive 
regulation pyramid comes to us by way of Australia.  The Australian Taxation Office’s 
(ATO) efforts to address noncompliance among barristers in New South Wales (NSW) 
show how agency action can respond to the actions of those the agency is regulating.170
In 1999, a tax officer at the ATO noticed that those in the legal profession under 
her review had exceptionally high debts to the ATO.171  While investigating the cause, 
bankruptcy came up as the source of the debts time and time again.172  Doubting that the 
legal market was doomed, she continued the investigation and discovered that wealthy 
lawyers were dodging income tax by repeatedly declaring bankruptcy, leaving the ATO 
as their only real creditor.173
                                                                                                                                                 
Schizer, supra note 154, at 355-371 (proposing a regulatory framework to align the government’s and 
lawyers’ interests in tax administration). 
168 See Ventry, Cooperative Tax Regulation, supra note 167, at 16 (citing Leviner, supra note 153). Ventry 
offers an example of incentivizing timely and correctly return filing by offering rebates.  Id. 
169 For example, those preparers with the higher compliance rates could have priority in receiving their 
refund, thereby getting refunds for their clients quicker.  Access to the DI program could be contingent on 
preparer registration and/or meeting certain compliance thresholds.  Those preparers who have lower 
compliance rates might also be subject to more stringent reporting or due diligence requirements. 
170 See Braithwaite, supra note 32, at 178-81 (telling story of ATO efforts to fight noncompliance among 
barristers in Australia). 
171 The rate of debt default was ten times higher the rest of the Australian population.  Id. at 178. 
172 Id. 
173 The ATO identified 62 licensed barristers who had declared bankruptcy between 1991 and 2001, with a 
third of them declaring bankruptcy repeatedly.  Some of the lawyers had declared bankruptcy as many as 
three times in a decade.  It was also revealed that barristers were one of the most active demographic 
groups investing in mass marketed aggressive tax planning schemes.  Id. at 178-79. 
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Following the responsive regulation pyramid, the ATO initially approached the 
NSW Bar Council to address the issue, seeking a self-regulatory solution as opposed to a 
more forceful intervention.174  The Bar Council considered the problem, and thought it 
more appropriate to have it regulated under the NSW Legal Services Tribunal as opposed 
to self-regulation.175  The Tribunal did not have the best track record with addressing 
problems of noncompliance by barristers, the ATO quickly moved up the pyramid, 
aggressively bringing in the most egregious cases before the courts.176  The 
Commissioner also spoke publicly about these schemes, and soon enough, the media got 
involved.177  Government officials quickly got into the mix, and began intimating that 
reform in the bankruptcy law might be in order.178   
The possibility of prohibiting recently bankrupt lawyers from practicing law 
seemed to light a fire under the NSW Bar Association, who became interested in dealing 
with the problem.179  The end result of this turned out to be some “modest law reform,” 
efforts to de-license those barristers with the most egregious histories of noncompliance, 
and some considerable self-regulatory reform, all of which had the effect of increased tax 
payments by barristers, increased enforcement of those barristers who remained 
noncompliant, and a substantial increase in the number of barristers remaining current 
with their tax returns.180
Though the ATO’s efforts were focused on aggressive tax shelters and outright 
tax avoidance, the IRS can take a page from the ATO playbook in addressing supply-side 
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and preparer-initiated errors in returns.  The IRS could follow an approach similar to the 
ATO’s.  Under this type of regulatory scheme, the IRS could focus on the national 
preparers who control a large segment of the market, and seek out those return preparers 
with unacceptably high error rates, bring the problem to their attention, and work with 
those preparers to create internal controls to ensure increased compliance.  An approach 
like this would likely involve more stringent reporting requirements.  Those preparers 
who are able to demonstrate the internal controls’ success and their resulting in increased 
compliance would no longer be subject to any of the reporting requirements, or perhaps 
report in less regular intervals.  The IRS would move up the regulatory pyramid for those 
who are unable to make a similar showing, subjecting them to audits and other more 
intrusive regulatory efforts, including the regular supplying of information regarding 
internal quality control measures, and the effects of training and internal audits on 
preparer performance. 
A prerequisite for this type of approach, however, is that the IRS must have 
sufficient information regarding who the good and who the bad actors are in the return 
preparation industry.  There is a deep need for the IRS to collect information by type of 
preparer, and have a nuanced understanding of error rates by preparer and by issue, with 
comparisons made between returns associated with RALs and those that are not. 181 
Encouraging good behavior must start with the IRS knowing and acting on information 
about how certain preparers are interacting with taxpayers. Changing preparer conduct 
through audits, or even heightened penalties or due diligence rules, should come only 
after the IRS encourages more positive steps, and only after the IRS directs disapproval 
                                                 
181 Cf. GAO, 2007 FILING SEASON, supra note 55, at 18 (discussing IRS plan to develop a database to 
“serve as a centralized repository of paid preparer information). 
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with what it perceives to be improper preparer conduct. For example, rather than default 
to audit when faced with information about likely errors associated with a geographic 
region of a national chain, one approach would involve the IRS visiting preparers to 
discuss best practices and reveal that there is information suggesting impermissible error 
rates associated with that preparers’ returns.182 The IRS could ask that the preparer report 
back on its internal quality control measures, review corporate culture and education, and 
encourage self-regulation before the IRS diverts to resource-intensive exercise of audits, 
and potential use of civil penalties and injunctions. The compliance stick would come at 
the tail end of government interaction.  
There are meaningful steps that Congress can take to encourage the IRS to move 
in this direction.  For example, the possible legislative change that would require 
registration and certification of preparers183 could help facilitate this.184 This possible 
additional regulation could be the trigger for the IRS to meaningfully track information 
related to preparers and encourage better behavior, while at the same time keeping its 
powder dry for the egregious actors who need more traditional sanction-based 
approaches. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The question that the IRS raised in its ANPR focused on whether RALs 
contribute to increased demand for overstated tax refunds.  This question itself raises 
many unanswered questions.  For example, does the additional speed in which 
individuals receive money embolden inappropriate taxpayer conduct?  If the answer is 
yes, assuming practitioners can influence taxpayer compliance decisions, will increased 
regulation of preparers generally or RALs in particular result in fewer taxpayers willing 
to misstate facts to generate an improper refund?  Do additional profits derived from 
RALs contribute to preparers’ willingness to turn a blind eye to existing due diligence 
rules?  Or even worse, do RALs contribute to conditions where preparers themselves are 
facilitating the noncompliance through more preparer-generated noncompliance efforts?  
These questions highlight the lack of information that hampers policymakers in designing 
effective measures to reduce the tax gap.  Until the IRS generates quantitative data that 
identifies, for example, preparer types and correlates error rates with types of preparers, 
and generates studies comparing error rates among preparers offering RALs as compared 
with non RAL-seeking taxpayers, it is difficult to justify taking measures that may 
effectively limit RALs on compliance reasons alone. 
This essay argues that in addition to the importance of additional research relating 
to preparers to backstop heavy-handed regulatory efforts, the IRS should broadly 
consider the insights from responsive regulation, and in particular consider ways to 
encourage preparers to self-regulate.  Self-regulation allows the IRS to preserve scarce 
compliance resources for egregious actors.  The focus on RALs in this essay allows for a 
further inquiry into the special role that preparers play in our tax system, and reflects the 
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possibility that meaningfully working with the preparer community can be a means to 
reducing the tax gap in the thorny area of refundable credits.  
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